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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3573  
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 5523  
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 9032  
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 9136  
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 2323  
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 4117  
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 9747  
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2943  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1543  
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 4558  
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI PRIORITY 9227  
RUEHCT/AMCONSUL KOLKATA PRIORITY 8913  
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI PRIORITY 8396  
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY  
RUCPDOG/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY  
RHMFISS/HQ USCENCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY  
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY  
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY  
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 6315  
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3945

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 NEW DELHI 001051  
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EO 12958 DECL: 03/01/2017  
TAGS PREL, PGOV, EFIN, PINR, MOPS, KDEM, KISL, IN  
SUBJECT: INDIANS OFFER BLEAK ASSESSMENT OF AFGHANISTAN AND  
SOUTH ASIAN REGION DURING CTJWG  
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Classified By: DCM Geoffrey Pyatt, Reason 1.4 (B, D)

11. (S) Summary: During the February 28, 2007 session of the U.S.-India Counter-Terrorism Joint Working Group (CTJWG), the Indian delegation gave the following summary of its assessment of the situation in Afghanistan: Internal Situation Deteriorating

12. (S) At the request of Ambassador K.C. Singh, head of the Indian delegation to the CTJWG, Sharad Kumar, Joint Secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat, said that the Indian delegation had observed that there were also signs of increasing ties between the Taliban and Al-Qa'ida elements on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and that the central government in Kabul had been largely unable to expand its influence outside of the capital. The country, Kumar said, was in a state of decline, and the Indian delegation was concerned about the situation in the country and noted that the Karzai government had been able to increase stability in the country.

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13. (S) India had committed \$750 million in assistance to Afghanistan, the goal of which was to help the country develop an economy that was not dependent on opium. India was specifically looking at improving controls on Indian precursor chemicals as a means to limit and control the opium trade. India was committed to assisting the Afghan economy, preventing the development of a Narco-State, and was committed to assisting the Afghan economy, preventing the development of a Narco-State.

14. (S) India had committed \$750 million in assistance to Afghanistan, the goal of which was to help the country develop an economy that was not dependent on opium. India was specifically looking at improving controls on Indian precursor chemicals as a means to limit and control the opium trade. India was committed to assisting the Afghan economy, preventing the development of a Narco-State, and was committed to assisting the Afghan economy, preventing the development of a Narco-State.

15. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that the U.S. shared some of India's concerns, but did not share in the overall bleak assessment. The U.S. was actively engaged in the country and noted that the Karzai government had been able to increase stability in the country.

16. (S) Continuing with his response, XXXXXXXXXXXX added threats from corruption within Afghanistan as yet another problem to be monitored and addressed. XXXXXXXXXXXX outlined some of the successes in the country and noted that the Karzai government had been able to increase stability in the country.

17. (S) In a very measured assessment of Pakistan, Ambassador Singh acknowledged U.S. reasons for pursuing CT cooperation with Pakistan, but said that the GOI currently saw a decline in the number of infiltrations across the Line of Control (LOC), said Singh, but it was too early to tell. Both sides had stepped up policing activities on the border; --It was still winter in the border regions; one could only get a real sense as the Bangalore and Hyderabad plots, Singh stated, were masterminded by terrorists who had come across the border with Bangladesh.

18. (S) India remained open and committed to the Counterterrorism Joint Mechanism with Pakistan. If dialogue was to succeed, Singh remarked, then India had to put Pakistan's willingness to engage to a legitimate test. Indian resolve will come under public scrutiny.

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19. (S) The potential worth of the mechanism had already been proven just this month, as both sides were able to insulate the bilateral relationship from the current situation in the country.

20. (S) For this round, India will be presenting its evidence on the July 2006 Mumbai blasts. Singh noted it was unclear whether the Indian investigation was complete or not.

21. (S) Turning to Sri Lanka, Ambassador Singh briefly recounted the historic reasons behind India's decision to adopt its current cautious posture towards Sri Lanka. Next Few Months are Crucial to Creating Stability

22. (S) The Indian side closed its presentation with a brief overview of the peace process in Nepal. Ambassador Singh reviewed the Indian calculations and the Indian side's assessment of the situation in Nepal.

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23. (S) Finding the right tools for border management was a key issue for India at this stage. Singh noted the "mushrooming" of the number of border management tools.

24. (U) This cable was cleared by XXXXXXXXXXXX. MULFORD